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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BRASHER MOTOR AND
FIKAXCE COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah eorporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.GEORGE AXDERSON, SELECT
CARS, INC., a Utah corporation,
anll TO~T CHAPMAN
Def e11da11fs and Appellants

'
)

Case
No. 10821

Defendants' and Appellants' Brief
ST A TE~IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an aetion brought by the plaintiff corporation
against G0org-e Anderson, the president of Select Cars,
Ine., a Ftah corporation, based on the theory that the
saill George Anderson guaranteed by written instrument
to pa!· any obligations of the defendant, Select Cars, Inc.,
o\\·ed t0 the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's claim is based upon a written instruIDP11t "·hieh the Distriet Court construed to be the personal guarantee of the defendant, George Anderson, to
pay the debts of the corporation.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon the trial of the case the lower court construed
the affidavit introduced by the plaintiff as Exhibit P-1
as a written guarantee by the president of the corporation to pay the debt of the corporation owed to the plaintiff. The lower court also granted the plaintiff attorneys' fees based upon a clause in the promissory notes
executed by the defendant corporation, Select Cars, Inc.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant, George Anderson, seeks to haYe t]J('
judgment of the trial court reversed and the complaint
as against him dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or a bout July 24, 1964, the plain tiff and the defendant, Select Cars, Inc., entered into a floor planningarrangment under the terms of which the plaintiff finnnce
company agreed to finance a floor plan for Select C'<lrs.
Inc.
Coincident with this plan the plaintiff, Select Can,
Inc., executed an affidai;·it for the pnrpose of authorizin!2:
Tony Chapman, one of the officers of Select Cars. Inc., to
bind the corporation in connection with mortgage notes
on automobiles to be floored with the plaintiff. The 110davit on its face recites that the corporation agrers to hr
bound by the signature of Tony Chapman and cont;;ins a
speciman signature of the said Tony Chapman. Suhst'2

quently the said Tony Chapman on behalf of the corporation, Select Cars, Inc., executed a series of promissory
notes with the plaintiff in connection with the floor plan11ing arrangement. Each of said notes was in the name
of the corporation only and containerl no personal guarnntres by the officers of the corporation. No personal
"n:uantee of any
. kind was eYer executed by. the defendants, George Anderson or Tony Chapman, and the plaintiff relies solely upon the affidaYit introduced as Exhibit
P-1 wl1ich it contends constitutes a personal guarantee
hy George Anderson, indiYiduaUy, and Tony Chapman,
to ra:· the dehts of the corporation.
-~

ARGUl\TEN'T
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PAROL EVIDENCE TO BE CONSIDERED FOR PURPOSES OF MODIFYING OR
REFOR~IING THE C 0 N T RA C T UPON
"WHiCH THE PLAI~TIFF HAS BROUGHT
ITS ACTION.
It is well settled taw in this state and in most jurisdictions that the courts in construing an agreement will
not add to or modify the terms of the instrument unless
the instrument is so ambiguous that it requir0s the
introduction of evidence for the purpose of understanding what the words of the instrument mean. The court
will not go heyond the four corners of the instrument
unless the instrume11t is so ambiguous that the language
rannot he interpreted. Trintlc Y. r·tah Idaho 811qar ('om;~

pany, 73 U. 215, 278 P. 312, Armstrong Y. Larson, j j 1T.
327, 186 P. 97, Mal/'lti City Saz,ings Bank Y. P('f('rs 011
'
33 U. 209, 93 P. 566.
This rule has been termed by the courts not to he n
rule of evidence at all hut a rule of suhstantiYr law and
the reason for this is obvious. If thiR rule did not control then no contract would he any more certain than thr
oral testimony of the individuals party to such contract
and their witnesses.
There is perhaps no principal more important to
the stability of commercial transactions and the relation"
of people in modern society than the principal that the
parties to an instrument must be held to the terms of thr
writing and cannot be heard to say that the~' intrn(led
some other legal effect than that expressed in the writing. In .Jensen's Used Cars v. .James T. RirP, 7 F.~rl
276, 323 P. 2d 259 the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah considered an almost identical situation ·with thr
facts involved in this appeal. In that case the plaintiff
sued the defendant on an automobile purchase contract
and the d0fendant contende<l that tlw contrad di<1 not
express the true arrangement made lwtwPen the parties
and introduced evidence as to what the true agrerment
was. The Utah Supreme Court, in holding that the parties, regardless of their intent, must he held to the trrms
of the agreement aR written, stated the rule as follows:
"Elementary it is that in construing contracts we seek to determine the intention of the
parties. But it is also elementary and of extreme
practical importance that we hold contracting parties to their fair and understandable language deliberately committed to writing and f'ndorRe<l hy
4

them as signatories thereto. "Were this not so business, one with another among our citizens, \vould he
rclpgated to the clrnotic, f'nd the hasic purpose of
the law to supply enforcPahlc rules of conduct
for the maintenance and improvement of an orderly society's welfare and progTPss would find
itself impotent. Tt is nnt mir0[1sonahle to hold
one rnsnonsihl" for lan<.,'1lf1Vf> '·'·hich h" J1imc:eH'
rspouses. Snch language is the only implement
hP dn•s us tn fashion a <i.etrrmination as tn thP
intentions of the narties. • • • The rule excluding
matters outside thr four corners of a clear, understandahlP document. is a fair one, and ones
contentions concerning his intent should extend
no further than his own clear expressions.
It was urged correctly that to admit matters
ontsidP a contract wonlcl do violence to the principal that one is hound by his manifestations of
assent, and that, irrespective of such contention,
snf'h matters proner]Y are Pxclndah}e hy the nar0l
evidence rule - which nlle, counsel suggests, is
0ne of snhstanti\·p ]aw rather than one of evidPnce. ''l1aten•r kind one ralls it, the rule
that excludes such evidence is a common sense
rule.'' p. 260-261.

The contract construed by the trial court can by no
possihlP interpretation he considered to be a guarantee
hy thP officers of Select Cars, Inc., that they would pay
the dehts of the corporation and ~vet the trial court considerPd testimony that prior to the execution of the
ngTePmPnt the partiPs agreed that the defendant, Geor.ge
Anderson, would be a guarantor of the corporate debt
and that the agreement was executed in furtherance of
this understanding. The exact language and contents of
the agreement is as follows :

AFFIDAVIT
This is to certify that the undersigned George
Anderson is conducting a U secl Car Business at
2580 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah, under the
name of Select Cars, Inc., which business and the
primary assets and business license thereof, stand
in the name of Select Cars, Inc. In consideration
for the Salt Lake .Auto Auction and Brasher ]\fo_
tor and Finance Co., Inc,. dealing with the undersigned in connection with said business, I herelw
authorize Tony Chapman to sign any drafts, co~
tracts or documents on behalf of said business
and hereby jointly and separately agree that each
and both of us shall he hound b~T the sig·natnre of
either of us in connection ,\·ith such transaction.
/s/ George Anderson, Pres.
George Anderson
SELECT CARS, I NC.
Dated this 24 day of July, 1964, at Salt Lake City.
Subscribed and sworn to hefore me this 24 day
of July, 1964.
/s/ Myron W. Horne
NOTARY PUBLIC

My commission expires Aug. 7, 1965.
The following is a specimen signature of Tony
Chapman
/s/ Tony Chapman
Tony Chapman
Subscribed and sworn to hefore me this -·--···-··
day of July, 1964.

XoTARY PPnLrc

6

The defendant testified that Exhibit 6-D was the
original proposed draft of the affidavit prepared by the
plaintiff finance corporation's officer, Myron D. Horne,
and that he objected to the language of the affidavit,
pointing out that Select Cars, Inc., was a corporation
and that it was not his personal business. He further
testified that the plaintiff's officer, Myron W. Horne,
then inserted the words "Inc." after the words "Select
Gars" and struck out the name "George Anderson" and
inserted ''Select Cars'' in his O\Yn handwriting. (R. pp.
81-82) The plaintiff then redrafted the affidavit into the
form which was finally executed (Exhibit P-1). In this
document there is no reference to George Anderson indi,,idnally at all.
The plaintiff's president, present at the meeting at
,\'11ich the agreement (Exhibit P-1) was prepared and
executed in the plaintiff's offices, testified that the plaintiff finance company had been in business for twenty
years, its principal business being floor planning credit
for automohiles (R. p. 60). It is difficult to conceive of
a finance company that has not prepared personal guarantPes for the signature of individuals seeking credit on
hehalf of a corporation and that if they intended the
afficlaYit to be the personal guarantee of George Anderson and Tony Chapman that they would have prepared it
in the form of Exhihit P-1. If the affidavit did not in
fact set forth the terms of the agreement as made, then
the remPdy of the plaintiff is to seek reformation of the
rontract. The plaintiff has not sought reformation of
the contract in this action but has sued on the affidavit,
alleging that the affidavit is a contract obligating George
7

Anderson and Tony Chapman to pay the obligations of
the corporation.
The affidavit recites that the business and primary
assets of the business are in the name of Select Cars
'
Inc., and that in consideration for the Salt Lake Auto
Auction and Brasher l\fotor and Finance Company, Inc.,
dealing with the corporation in connection with said business Tony Chapman is authorized to sign drafts, contracts or documents on behalf of the business. The affidaYit at the bottom contains a specimen signature of
Tony Chapman and the affidaYit is signed by Select Cars.
Inc., George Anderson, Pres. There is nothing amliignous about the document. It is perfectly apparent that
the document was intended to be an authorization for
Tony Chapman to sign notes and contracts ineident to
the operation of the business of which Mr. Chapman wn.~
the manager. It will be noted that on all of the notes
the notes are signed by the corporation only and that
the notes do not purport to bind either l\fr. Chapman or
l\fr. Anderson indiYidually. The testimony giYen hy -:'if r.
Anderson to the effect that the purport and intent of
the affidavit was simply to proYide an authority for Tony
Chapman to bind the corporation is the only reascnahlr
construction that can be placed on the document. To
permit the plaintiff to seek reconry against l\Ir. Chapman and Mr. Anderson on the theory that prior to the
signing of the affidm·it it was agreed that they or either
of them would be individually liable would he to <'ompletely re-write the agreement between the parties. ·whe1~
wf' consider that the plaintiff drafted the agreement and
it, therefore, should he constructed against the plaintiff,
8

and that the plaintiff is a finance company having conducted this type of business for twenty years, it is inconceivable that they could have believed that this document constituted a guarantee hy Anderson and Chapman
of the corporate deht. The trial court in so holding has
completely re-written the agreement between the parties
and has reformed the contract to entirely change the language adopted by the parties in reaching its decision.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
ANY ATTORNEYS' FEES SINCE NO EVIDENCE WAS EVEN OFFERED IN CONNECTION WITH THIS CLAIM.
The plaintiff claims to be entitled to its attorneys'
fees in connection with this action. There was no evidence introduced at the trial by the plaintiff in support
of this contention and notwithstanding this the court
granted the plaintiff a judgment for attorneys' fees
against the defendant corporation and its president,
George Anderson, in the amount of $622.93. Title 78-37-9,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:
"Attorney's Fees: In all cases of foreclosures,
when an attorney's fee is claimed by the plaintiff,
the amount thereof shall be fixed by the Court,
any stipulation to the contrary notwithstanding;
provided no other or greater amount shall be allowed or decreed than the sum which shall appear
by the evidence to be actually charged by and to be
paid to the attorney for the plaintiff. (Emphasis
supplied)
9

The foregoing statute limits the recovery of attor.
neys' fees to the amount shown by the evidence of the
plaintiff and in this case the plaintiff offered no evidence
whatever and is, therefore, not entitled to any juclgment
for attorneys' fees.
CONCLUSION
The court erred in holding the defendant, George
Anderson, liable for the dehts of the corporation, ~elect
Cars, Inc., since the written agreement hetween the parties does not so provide.
The court also erred in granting attorneys' fees to
the plaintiff since the plaintiff offered no evidence whatever to sustain such an award.
Respectfully submitted,
GORDON I. HYDE
555 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Defenda11ts
and Appella,nts
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